Stationary Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games [Articol]

dc.contributor.authorLozovanu, Dmitriiro
dc.contributor.authorPickl, Stefanen
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-05T07:31:37Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThe problem of the existence and determining stationary Nash equilibria for stochastic positional games with discounted and average payoffs is considered. We show that, for a stochastic positional game with discounted payoffs, there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure stationary strategies and, for a stochastic positional game with average payoffs, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed stationary strategies. Some approaches for determining pure and mixed stationary equilibria in such games are proposed.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis research was supported by the project “011302: Analitical and numerical methods for solving stochastic dynamic decision problems”.
dc.identifier.citationLOZOVANU, Dmitrii and Stefan PICKL. Stationary Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games. In: International Conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the foundation of Vladimir Andrunachievici Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, MSU, October 10-13 2024. Chisinau: [S. n.], 2024, pp. 15-18. ISBN 978-9975-68-515-3en
dc.identifier.isbn978-9975-68-515-3
dc.identifier.urihttps://msuir.usm.md/handle/123456789/17956
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectstochastic positional gamesen
dc.subjectaverage and discountedpayoffsen
dc.subjectpure and mixed strategiesen
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen
dc.titleStationary Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games [Articol]en
dc.typeArticle

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Lozovanu Dmitrii 15-18.pdf
Size:
771.56 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:

Collections