Stationary Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games [Articol]

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2024

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Abstract

The problem of the existence and determining stationary Nash equilibria for stochastic positional games with discounted and average payoffs is considered. We show that, for a stochastic positional game with discounted payoffs, there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure stationary strategies and, for a stochastic positional game with average payoffs, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed stationary strategies. Some approaches for determining pure and mixed stationary equilibria in such games are proposed.

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stochastic positional games, average and discountedpayoffs, pure and mixed strategies, Nash equilibrium

Citation

LOZOVANU, Dmitrii and Stefan PICKL. Stationary Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games. In: International Conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the foundation of Vladimir Andrunachievici Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, MSU, October 10-13 2024. Chisinau: [S. n.], 2024, pp. 15-18. ISBN 978-9975-68-515-3

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