Perspective wittgensteiniene asupra conceptului de gramatică [Articol]
Date
2025-05-22
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
CEP USM
Abstract
Articolul analizează sensul pe care Ludwig Wittgenstein îl atribuie conceptului de „gramatică” în filosofia sa târzie, apropiat și în același timp distinct de înțelesurile obișnuite din lingvistică sau filologie. Gramatica, în accepția sa, este atât demersul de descriere a folosirii și regulilor de folosire a cuvintelor și enunțurilor, cât și aceste reguli înseși. Gramatica devine astfel sistemul de reguli ce fac posibil sensul, având un caracter intersubiectiv, implicit și non-teoretic. Remarcile sau propozițiile gramaticale (spre deosebire de cele empirice) nu transmit informații noi, ci clarifică ceea ce este deja operant în uzajul comun. Prin exemple concrete – precum analiza propoziției „sunt aici” – se arată cum scoaterea enunțurilor din contextul lor de utilizare duce la confuzii filosofice. Din această perspectivă, gramatica în sensul wittgensteinian nu propune o teorie a limbajului, ci o formă de reamintire menită să restabilească claritatea în fața fascinației produse de formele noastre de exprimare.
This paper examines the meaning Ludwig Wittgenstein assigns to the concept of “grammar” in his late philosophy, a notion both close to and distinct from its common usage in linguistics or philology. Grammar, in his view, refers both to the project of describing the use and rules of language, and to the rules themselves. As such, grammar is the system of rules that makes meaning possible, and it is intersubjective, implicit, and non-theoretical in nature. Grammatical remarks or propositions‒unlike empirical ones ‒ do not convey new information, but clarify what is already operative in ordinary language use. Through concrete examples ‒ such as the analysis of the proposition “I am here” ‒ this paper shows how removing utterances from their context of use leads to philosophical confusion. From this perspective, Wittgensteinian grammar does not propose a theory of language, but a form of recollection aimed at restoring clarity in the face of the fascination exerted by our ways of speaking.
This paper examines the meaning Ludwig Wittgenstein assigns to the concept of “grammar” in his late philosophy, a notion both close to and distinct from its common usage in linguistics or philology. Grammar, in his view, refers both to the project of describing the use and rules of language, and to the rules themselves. As such, grammar is the system of rules that makes meaning possible, and it is intersubjective, implicit, and non-theoretical in nature. Grammatical remarks or propositions‒unlike empirical ones ‒ do not convey new information, but clarify what is already operative in ordinary language use. Through concrete examples ‒ such as the analysis of the proposition “I am here” ‒ this paper shows how removing utterances from their context of use leads to philosophical confusion. From this perspective, Wittgensteinian grammar does not propose a theory of language, but a form of recollection aimed at restoring clarity in the face of the fascination exerted by our ways of speaking.
Description
Keywords
Wittgenstein, gramatică, propoziție gramaticală, propoziție empirică, uz, grammar, grammatical proposition, empirical proposition, use
Citation
COSMESCU, Alexandru. Perspective wittgensteiniene asupra conceptului de gramatică. În: Lecturi in memoriam acad. Silviu Berejan: conferinţa ştiinţifică naţională, ediţia a 7-a. Chişinău, 22 mai, 2025. Chişinău: CEP USM, 2025, pp. 52–60. ISBN 978-9975-62-886-0. Disponibil: https://doi.org/10.52505/lecturi.2025.07.05