Informational Extended Games And Their Applications [Articol]
| dc.contributor.author | Novac, Ludmila | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-07-09T09:43:46Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this article, we analyse informational extended games, i.e., games in which the players choose their actions simultaneously, with assumption that they have some information about the future strategies which will be chosen by other players. For all informational extended games of this type we assume that players’ payoff functions are common knowledge. Under these assumptions we define the noncooperative informational extended games and analyse Nash equilibrium. As a particular case of the non-cooperative informational extended games, we analyse the class of bimatrix informational extended games and we present an example of game in order to show the possibility to use the information for this class of games. | en |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This research was supported in the framework of the project “011302: Analitical and numerical methods for solving stochastic dynamic decision problems”. | en |
| dc.identifier.citation | NOVAC, Ludmila. Informational Extended Games And Their Applications. In: International Conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the foundation of Vladimir Andrunachievici Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, MSU, October 10-13 2024. Chisinau: [S. n.], 2024, pp. 456-461. ISBN 978-9975-68-515-3. | en |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-9975-68-515-3 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://msuir.usm.md/handle/123456789/18291 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | informational extended games | en |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | en |
| dc.subject | best response mapping | en |
| dc.subject | point-to-set mapping | en |
| dc.subject | fixed points | en |
| dc.title | Informational Extended Games And Their Applications [Articol] | en |
| dc.type | Article |