Institutul de Matematică şi Informatică "Vladimir Andrunachievici"

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Subject: search.filters.subject.Nash equilibrium

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    Informational Extended Games And Their Applications [Articol]
    (2024) Novac, Ludmila
    In this article, we analyse informational extended games, i.e., games in which the players choose their actions simultaneously, with assumption that they have some information about the future strategies which will be chosen by other players. For all informational extended games of this type we assume that players’ payoff functions are common knowledge. Under these assumptions we define the noncooperative informational extended games and analyse Nash equilibrium. As a particular case of the non-cooperative informational extended games, we analyse the class of bimatrix informational extended games and we present an example of game in order to show the possibility to use the information for this class of games.
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    Transportation Problems, the Braess Paradox and Network Coordination [Articol]
    (2024) Gorbachuk, Vasyl; Dunaievskyi, Maksym; Havrylenko, Serhiy
    Traveling through the transport network or sending information packets via the Internet is implicitly based on game-theoretic considerations: a specific decision-maker (DM), choosing his or her route, takes into account the probability of congestion depending on all DMs, that is, other routes. Based on similar considerations, it is possible to develop models for network traffic. These models explain some paradoxical observations where increasing the capacity of a given network can slow down its traffic under certain circumstances.
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    Stationary Nash Equilibria for Stochastic Positional Games [Articol]
    (2024) Lozovanu, Dmitrii; Pickl, Stefan
    The problem of the existence and determining stationary Nash equilibria for stochastic positional games with discounted and average payoffs is considered. We show that, for a stochastic positional game with discounted payoffs, there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure stationary strategies and, for a stochastic positional game with average payoffs, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed stationary strategies. Some approaches for determining pure and mixed stationary equilibria in such games are proposed.