2. Articole

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Subject: search.filters.subject.informational extended games

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    NASH EQUILIBRIA IN THE NONCOOPERATIVE INFORMATIONALEXTENDED GAMES
    (Institutul de Matematică şi Informatică al AŞM, 2009) Novac, Ludmila
    In this article¤we will analyse informational extended games, i.e. games in which the players choose their actions simultaneously, with assumption that they have some information about the future strategies which will be chosen by other players. All informational extended games of this type will assume that players' payoff functions are common knowledge. Under these assumptions the last section will define the informational extended games and analyse Nash equilibrium and conditions of its existence. The essential result of this article is a theorem of Nash equilibrium existence in informational extended games with n players. Our treatment is based on a standard fixed point theorem which will be stated without proof in the first section.
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    PARALLEL ALGORITHM TO SOLVE TWO PERSON GAME WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
    (Valines SRL, 2014) Hâncu, Boris
    In this article for solving the informational extended games we apply the Selten-Harsanyi principle. We elaborate the parallel algorithm to determine the Bayes-Nash equilibrium profile in informational extended games.
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    DYNAMIC GAMES IN INFORMATIONAL EXTENDED STRATEGIES
    (Valines SRL, 2014) Cocilrla, M.
    In this article we'll have a short view over the dynamic form of the informational extended games. For constructing the dynamic form of the double-sided informational extended games we'll use the dynamic Bayesian games. A parallel backward induction algorithm, for solving informational extended games with informational °ow is oriented in two directions, based on Zermelo's algorithm will be given.
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    APPROACHES FOR SOLVING BIMATRIX INFORMATIONAL EXTENDED GAMES
    (CEP USM, 2015) Hâncu, Boris; Cocîrlă, Mihai
    Different ways of solving bimatrix games in complete and perfect information (or over the set of informationalextended strategies) are studied in the present paper. The Nash and Bayes-Nash solutions for informational extended games are discussed.