JUDGES AGAINST JUDGES

JUDECĂTORI ÎMPOTRIVA JUDECĂTORILOR

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ABSTRACT. *The discipline of judges is an essential pillar of the judicial career. The proper management of this field is imperative, from the perspective of the need to ensure the balance between judicial independence and judicial responsibility, but also from the perspective of the impact of a disciplinary procedure on the image of the concerned judges and on the judiciary. In this context, the activity of the specialized bodies subordinated to the Superior Council of Magistracy with competencies regarding judicial discipline (the Disciplinary Board and the Judicial Inspection) is of increased doctrinal and professional interest. An overview of the current situation on this dimension is reflected in the Decisions of the Disciplinary Board and in the Annual Activity Reports of the concerned entities.*

The paper includes an analysis focused on a new trend found by the Judicial Inspection in 2022, namely on the fact of the submission of notifications regarding possible disciplinary violations committed by judges - also by fellow judges. What would be the causes that generated such a trend, how does this trend reflect the state of affairs in the judiciary, what would be the role of judicial self-government in ensuring the responsibility of individual judges and what would be the value of professional communication within the judicial system - these are some aspects researched in the paper, from the perspective of governance modernization mechanisms, focused on the protection of human rights.

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***Keywords**: judicial discipline, self-governance of justice, fellow judges, judicial communication*

REZUMAT. *Disciplina judecătorilor reprezintă un pilon esențial al carierei judiciare. Gestionarea corespunzătoare a acestui domeniu este un imperativ, din perspectiva necesității asigurării echilibrului dintre independența judiciară și responsabilitatea judiciară, dar și din perspectiva impactului unei proceduri disciplinare asupra imaginii judecătorilor vizați și a magistraturii în ansamblu. În context, activitatea organelor specializate din subordinea Consiliului Superior al Magistraturii cu competențe privind disciplina judiciară (Colegiul Disciplinar și Inspecția Judiciară) prezintă interes doctrinar și profesional sporit. O privire de ansamblu asupra situației pe această dimensiune este reflectată în Hotărârile Colegiului Disciplinar și în Rapoartele de activitate anuale ale entităților vizate.*

Lucrarea cuprinde o analiză direcționată pe o tendință nouă constatată de Inspecția Judiciară în anul 2022 și anume pe faptul depunerii sesizărilor cu privire la posibile abateri disciplinare comise de judecători – tot de către colegii judecători. Care ar fi cauzele ce au generat o asemenea tendință, cum reflectă această tendință starea de lucruri din justiție, care ar fi rolul

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autoguvernării judecătorești în responsabilizarea judecătorilor individuali și care ar fi valoarea comunicării profesionale în cadrul sistemului judiciar – sunt câteva aspecte cercetate în lucrare, din perspectiva mecanismelor de modernizare a guvernanței, axate pe protecția drepturilor omului.

Articolul este elaborat în cadrul Proiectului „Modernizarea mecanismelor de guvernare axate pe protecția drepturilor omului", cifrul 20.80009.1606.15, în L.C.Ș. „Dreptul Public Comparat și e-Guvernare", Facultatea de Drept, Universitatea de Stat din Moldova.

***Cuvinte-cheie**: disciplina judiciară, autoguvernarea justiției, judecători, colegi, comunicarea judiciară*

Introduction

Disciplinary liability of judges is a mechanism for accountability of the justice system. The national normative-legal framework establishes rules, procedures and guarantees to ensure the efficiency of this legal institution. In the legal system of the Republic of Moldova, the role of judicial self-governance bodies in managing the career of magistrates is substantial. The Superior Council of Magistracy, a constitutional entity, is the guarantor of the independence of the judicial authority and ensures the appointment, transfer, secondment, promotion, and application of disciplinary measures against judges.[1, art.121^1, art.123 para (1)] The discipline of judges (including the adoption of the decision on the dismissal of judges and the dismissal of court presidents and vice-presidents) is a field of competence of the Superior Council of Magistracy [2, art. 4 para (3) letter c), c^1)]. The Disciplinary Board and the Judicial Inspection, specialized bodies subordinated to the Superior Council of the Magistracy, have specific powers in carrying out the disciplinary procedure of judges: the Disciplinary Board examines disciplinary cases regarding judges in office and judges who have resigned, for acts committed while exercising the function of a judge, and apply disciplinary sanctions [3, art.8 para (1)], and the Judicial Inspection verifies the reports or, as the case may be, self-reports on the facts that may constitute disciplinary violations [4, art.7^1 para (6) letter b^1)] and, in fact, performs the primary checks regarding the existence or non-existence of elements of judicial disciplinary misconduct.

Disciplinary liability of judges in the legal system of the Republic of Moldova

In general, the submission of notifications regarding judicial discipline is a natural procedure for a justice system operating on the basis of the principles of responsibility, transparency, integrity. This is a mechanism to hold the system accountable and, most often, such complaints are submitted by participants in judicial processes, who invoke disciplinary violations in the conduct of certain judges.

It is the same situation in the legal system of the Republic of Moldova. For the most part, litigants are the ones who notify the judicial self-administration bodies, this possibility being enshrined in the law: the notification can be submitted by the person whose rights were violated as a result of the act committed by the judge or another person who can invokes a legitimate interest [5, art.19 para (1) letter a)].

However, many referrals, although they claim to refer to the commission of disciplinary violations, in fact, refer to issues that do not belong to the competence of the Judicial Inspection or the Superior Council of Magistracy. For example, in 2022, a large part of the notifications concerned the disagreement with the court decisions, the incompetence of judges, violation of the deadlines for the release of copies of judicial acts, according to requests, including the issuance of judicial acts in Russian, non-issue of the copy of the minutes of the court session and of the audio recording of the court session, non-referral of the case to the court of appeal or recourse, return of the summons request, postponement of the court hearing, language criteria, etc. [6, p.6] This state of affairs is maintained from year to year (2021 [7, p.8], 2020 [8, p.27-28] , 2019 [9, p.30]).

There are also multiple referrals filed by representatives of the legal professions, particularly by prosecutors and lawyers.

However, 2023 was distinguished by a new specificity of notifications [10, p.7]: the authors of the referrals were magistrates, who invoked the commission of disciplinary offenses by other magistrates, colleagues from the same court or from other courts. This phenomenon is of interest for research, from the perspective of understanding the causes that generated such trends, the impact of these referrals on the judicial career, the state of affairs in the judiciary, but also the management of communication within the system.

The brief analysis of the decisions of the Disciplinary Board, issued in 2022 in the disciplinary proceedings initiated on the complaints filed by judges against judges, reveals that they are quite different in terms of object and legal basis. In such a situation, it is quite difficult to draw definite conclusions regarding the merits of this specific complaint and the impact they will have on judicial ethics and discipline, the working climate in the collectives of magistrates and on the image of justice. The difficulty is also generated by the uncertainty of the final solutions in the respective disciplinary cases; or, the decisions of the Disciplinary Board are not final and can be challenged administratively (at the Superior Council of Magistracy) or judicially (in the court, in the administrative litigation procedure), as the case may be.

Synthesis of disciplinary cases filed at judges' complaints

In one case, a judge from a higher court filed a complaint against a judge from a lower court, on the grounds that the latter had examined the case extremely superficially and violated of the law. The disciplinary procedure was terminated due to the existence of procedural defects. [11]

In another case, the interim president of the court filed a complaint against a judge of the same court, for unmotivated absence from work, by fraudulently acquiring the status of grandmother who benefited from partially paid leave for care of the minor child up to the age of 3 and additional unpaid leave for the care of the child

from 3 to 4 years old. The Judicial Inspection and the Disciplinary Board rejected the complaint as unfounded. [12]

Several disciplinary proceedings have as subjects the same judges within a court, including judges with managerial functions, who have filed complaints against each other under different circumstances. The same instance manager is targeted. In the actions of all the judges, the elements of disciplinary violations were found, the sanctions applied being the warning and, accordingly, the reprimand (Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.4/3 of March 18, 2022 [13]; Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.7/3 of March 18, 2022 [14]; Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.9/3 of March 18, 2022 [15]).

A judge filed several referrals against fellow judges in the same court, including against the president of the court, alleging the exercise of illegitimate influence against him and interference with the administration of justice. The Disciplinary Board did not find the existence of disciplinary violations in any of the cases (Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.240/11 of November 18, 2022[16]; Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.7/6 of June 30, 2023 [17]).

Mutual complaints regarding judicial conduct were submitted by judges with managerial functions (the vice-president and the interim president of the Supreme Court of Justice). One plaintiff alleged discriminatory and disrespectful behavior of the president of the court in relation to the judge (the case was returned to the Judicial Inspection for additional verifications [18]) and, correspondingly – the judge's non-compliance with the administration's indications (no disciplinary violations were found [19]).

Some circumstances revealed in notifications filed by court managers regarding the actions of certain judges working in the same court, had a rather serious impact on the careers of the judges concerned. In one case, the adoption, in the same criminal case, of two sentences with different contents, was the basis for finding disciplinary misconduct and sending the materials to the General Prosecutor's Office, for the verification of these circumstances (Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.12/4 of April 22, 2022 [20]). In another case, the president of the court filed a referral for multiple complaints and addresses received from the litigants regarding the violation of the legislation, non-compliance with the deadlines for the examination of the cases and the execution of the of disposition acts, in the cases under examination of a rank-and-file judge of that court (Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.11/4 of April 22, 2022 [21]). In both cases, it was decided to dismiss the notified judges.

In 2022, a specific situation was also registered - a collective referral, submitted by a number of 14 judges of a court against the actions of the interim vice-president of the court. The violation by the vice-president of the court of the legal provisions regarding the random redistribution of several cases was invoked, in connection with a judge being on unused annual leave for more than 4 months, as well as, on the one hand, discriminatory and abusive behavior in relation to the judges who filed the

referral, and on the other hand – preferential treatment in relation to the judge on leave. The Judicial Inspection and the Disciplinary Board rejected the collective appeal, in the conduct of the vice-president of the court wasn't retained the constituent elements of a disciplinary offense (Decision of the Disciplinary Board no.88/6 of April 29, 2022 [22]).

Findings and discussions

Given the variety of notifications submitted, according to the object and legal basis, we will try to make certain findings, to give certain assessments regarding some solutions to streamline the institution of disciplinary liability of judges, through mechanisms of judicial self-governance, including through the efforts of the judiciary.

Is the new phenomenon, regarding the filing of referrals by judges against judges, a positive or negative fact?

Should judges, including court presidents, continue this practice or refrain from it?

Does this phenomenon reflect an act of courage and responsibility? Or rather an act of undermining the credibility of justice, by displaying to the public judicial conduct allegedly contrary to judicial discipline?

These, for now, remain questions without univocal answers.

Basically, judges have the right to invoke the violation of disciplinary offenses by their colleagues, because they invoke a legitimate interest, in the sense of the Law on the disciplinary liability of judges [23, art.19 para 1 letter a)]. Judicial integrity and accountability are indispensable values of good judicial governance and the mechanisms for strengthening these values are pillars of a public service focused on the protection of human rights. Perhaps, at first glance, such a state of affairs could affect the image of the system. However, for the society this would rather be a signal that justice is not a closed caste and within the system there is diversity of voices and diversity of positions, and the self-improvement and self-purification of the system are levers effectively put into operation.

Beyond the concrete cases examined in the present study, on which we will not judge separately, the final decision to be taken at the level of judicial self-administration (Superior Council of Magistracy) and judicial control, as appropriate, we will stop at a few basic ideas, which come to validate research hypotheses analyzed over four years, from a regulatory, doctrinal and practical point of view, within the *Modernization of governance mechanisms focused on the protection of human rights* State Project.

Judges must be vocal and active. Currently, judicial independence is accepted as an indispensable standard of the system of guarantees of the right to a fair trial. Studies on judicial independence argue the imperative of guaranteeing judicial independence at the highest level in a complex approach: referring to external inde-

pendence (regarding economic, political actors) and internal independence (within the judiciary). And sometimes the increased emphasis on this standard of judicial independence, supplemented by the recommendation of moderation and restraint in the expression of judges, creates erroneous perceptions of judicial conduct in the overall context of the governing act. Independence, impartiality and reserved public expression have the role of strengthening the capacities of the judiciary in exercising the act of justice in the spirit of the priority protection and guarantee of human rights. These guarantees and characteristics do not mean isolating the judiciary from the other branches of the power and from the society, nor turning it into a corporation of the elites. Therefore, the judiciary and individual judges should take a stand and act, within statutory limits, in situations where institutional silence is not a solution. Judges must be vocal and active when there is a risk of deliberate undermining of judicial independence and image through the lens of external factors (especially through speeches by political actors provided to the public in order to intimidate judges or exert pressure on the judiciary for populist, electoral purposes).

But judges must be vocal and active also when internal factors proliferate likely to affect the integrity and image of the judiciary (when the judges themselves show blatant and unforgivable disregard for legal and ethical norms). And, if in conflict with external factors the reaction of the Councils for the Judiciary should be prompt and consistent, then in conflicts of an internal nature the response should come precisely from the judges, with or without managerial functions. In such situations, the submission by judges of referrals regarding judicial discipline against fellow judges would not only be justified, but also necessary. This would be an internal system self-discipline mechanism.

The management of judicial communication must be treated as a subject of utmost importance to ensure the image of justice. Although recent research puts increased emphasis on the importance of communication and emotional intelligence in the context of work performance, the reality appears to be more complicated. Basically, judicial communication is reflected in reasoned judicial decisions, as materialized forms of access to justice and a fair trial. But judicial communication is not limited to court decisions; judges should be prepared to communicate with the public, not just in borderline situations.

'In the past, many judges and prosecutors have fallen into the trap of a poorly mastered communication, with negative consequences for the effective administration of justice and the image of the justice system in general' [24, para 3.8]. Polish magistrates became aware of their insufficient preparedness to communicate with the public in crucial circumstances for justice and society, related to the modification of justice laws and the proliferation of the risk of undermining, in this way, judicial independence; through efforts and solidarity with professional associations of judges and representatives of other legal professions, they managed to build communication strategies and be vocal, at national (Poland) and European levels [25].

A judiciary in the service of society is built on a qualitative management of judicial communication, which includes: professional and interprofessional training and education; thematic discussions at the collective level of the court or several courts; adequate working conditions; effective social and legal guarantees; balanced workload; communication strategies aimed at establishing a friendly psychological climate, which would allow judges and court staff to exercise their duties without pressures of an emotionally destructive nature. The use by the manager or by the judge(s) of reactive, aggressive verbal or non-verbal language can have a destructive impact on the quality and efficiency of the judicial act itself. 'How well or poorly a particular judge lives up to the temperamental expectations of judicial office depends to no small degree on his or her tendencies toward particular patterns of emotional experience and regulation. These tendencies are deep. […] They drive behavior, particularly in the stressful situations that typify most forms of judging.' [26, p.2152]

The human component of the judge actor requires a human approach, and the process of building a user-friendly justice service can be supported by open judicial communication. On the assumption that, by their nature, internal conflicts can be resolved through proactive communication, the filing of disciplinary complaints by judges against judges should be avoided.

The role of court presidents in holding judges accountable and exercising judicial communication management should be effectively realized. In essence, an institution leader has a major role in obtaining performance indicators, in promoting the institution's image, in ensuring the lucrative web of climate and collective work discipline. The managerial function in justice is quite demanding, starting from the specifics of the sphere of activity [27, para 6]. Therefore, a court president who tends to obtain by the institution and by the judges working in that court high indicators of judicial quality and efficiency, also has the duty to react to the allegedly illegal conduct of the judges, regardless of the legal nature of the violation. When a judge of the lead court is targeted in multiple complaints from litigants, the president of the court is the first one who has the obligation to verify the basis of the complaints and to take the necessary measures to protect the image and integrity of the judge targeted in the referral and the lead court. In such circumstances, the court manager could be forced by the situation to submit a complaint to the judicial self-administration bodies, against the fellow judge, in order to safeguard the integrity of justice and the responsibility of judges. 'Without strong mechanisms for signaling intolerance for judicial misconduct, the judiciary makes itself vulnerable to a whole host of potential risks' [28, p.980].

In the context of judicial communication management, managerial communication is an essential pillar of the climate of judicial integrity. The institutional communication strategy is a guiding factor of the work process in that court. Similarly, the president of the court has a substantial role - as a legal institution, but also as a personality. Or, 'individuals holding this office may significantly affect the authority

and legitimacy of this institution, which in turn determines real influence of court presidents in a given jurisdiction' [29, p.2069].

Applying the findings to the disciplinary procedures mentioned above, the fact that the same judges, working in the same court, including with administrative functions, file complaints against each other, is a not-so-subtle form of reflection of an inappropriate work climate in the respective collective, which should capture the attention of the manager of the concerned instance.

The management of risk situations and of psychological stress by judges should be treated seriously. In this sense, taking over good practices from other jurisdictions could be an option: offering thematic training on the management of aggression or emotionally demanding work (Netherlands); provision of training courses on the psychological burden of judges, stress and violence at work, including specialized courses for court administrators (France); providing judges with social and individual support from psychologists (Belgium); guidance and assistance in finding solutions for reconciling family and professional life, including the provision of psychological support, by a private group, funded by magistrates' associations (Canada), etc. [30, para 108, 109, 115, 117]

It is an indispensable aspect of communication management in judicial institutions, which could contribute to the resolution of potential conflicts between magistrates through less radical methods than reporting to the Judicial Inspection.

Collective referrals filed by judges against a fellow judge, including against the president of the court, are a signal of tension within the judiciary. Beyond the disciplinary case of this kind mentioned previously, such types of tensions would be opportune to resolve by making the communication act more efficient, inside the system. An effective communication act would mean finding consensus in law and good practices. A collective referral would be necessary in the event of the existence of clear and consistent signs of serious violations of legal norms by the judge, with or without a managerial function. Otherwise, such actions can generate a rather complicated perspective in the work of the collective of judges, in terms of psychological comfort, trust, collegial support. In its recommendations, CEPEJ demonstrated the connection between the quality of the judicial act and the well-being of judges, including from an emotional point of view. [31, guideline 6]

Disciplinary complaints should not be used by judges as retaliatory remedies. The fact of filing mutual notifications, one against the other, by judges against judges, outlines the existence of hostile relations between certain judges. Exposing these realities to the public does not benefit the justice system. Transparency of justice involves also the publication of the decisions of the Disciplinary Board in specific disciplinary cases. The simple reading of these judgments, which refer to or quote specific wordings from the examined referrals, gives the reader - the public - the opportunity to create their own impressions, to assess the type of relationships existing between the judges in conflict. Regardless of the final solutions adopted in such

cases, the data provided reveal aspects less beneficial to the image of justice and indicators of a faulty communication management and managerial communication.

'It is important that the judiciary provides an atmosphere that allows judges to make critical comments […]. However, judges should avail themselves first of any existing remedial measures, before going public' [32, para 5.3].

The role of judicial self-administration bodies in the management of disciplinary referrals filed by judges against judges. Regarding the role of judicial self-administration bodies in the management of the judicial career, through the disciplinary liability institution, each body has the prerogative to act within the limits of legal competencies. The Judicial Inspection and the Disciplinary Board have the obligation to examine the referrals/contestations received regarding judicial discipline. Therefore, the act of communication will be exclusively the formal legal act, adopted according to the procedures and respecting the content requirements. In any case, motivation is the substance that will give answers to issues regarding judicial ethics, discipline, responsibility, independence, impartiality.

However, an important role in facilitating a judicial communication, based on the win-win model, should fall to the management, on scientific principles, of judicial ethics, 'as a system of professional values, [...] based on the principle of self-regulation, by *judges of judges'* [33, p.55].

Such a role could be assumed by the Commission on Ethics and Professional Conduct of Judges. At the moment, this entity does not seem to be very visible and vocal in the self-governance of justice. From the moment of its creation, in 2018, the members of the commission met at only 3 meetings and adopted 4 Opinions (on the participation of judges in political activities; on the impartiality of the judge; the use of social media by judges; judges' communication with court staff, prosecutors, lawyers and other judges) [34]. The Ethics Commission on Ethics would strengthen its mission as a preventive mechanism, without being confused with the disciplinary mechanism, the relevant normative-legal framework being quite clear in this regard: the Commission is not entitled to issue an advisory opinion/recommendation in a dilemma or problem, which is known to be the subject of a dispute, or a past or pending investigation or disciplinary procedure, or there is already an advisory opinion of the Commission, in this regard [35, para 4.3].

We are confident that the strengthening of the role of the Ethics Commission, together with the practical improvement of the judicial communication strategy and the awareness of the negative impact of arrogance and adversity, externalized by certain judges, on the work climate and on the image of justice would be able to prevent the use of the mechanism disciplinary as a method of revenge. The national normative-legal regulations allow the Ethics Commission to follow the CEPEJ recommendations regarding the development of positive ethics and the provision of personalized support to judges, independent of any disciplinary procedure [36, guideline 7].

And yes, the Judicial Inspection could contribute to the improvement of the preventive and disciplinary mechanism, to the promotion of the culture of collegiality and judicial integrity, by analyzing the specifics found, regarding the filing of complaints by judges against judges and the reasoned assessment of the causes of such a phenomenon, of the impact on the integrity, independence and accountability of judges and on the image and credibility of justice as a system and public service. Or, 'in States where they exist, judicial inspectorates, on the basis of their observations of judges' behaviour, could contribute to the development of ethical thinking; their views could be made known through their annual reports' [37, para 46].

Judges need functional mechanisms for overcoming ethical dilemmas, guaranteeing judicial independence. As a good practice, the solution found in the French legal system as of 2016 is quite interesting and could be examined in the context of other jurisdictions. This refers to the creation of an 'Ethics Assistance and Monitoring Service' attached to the High Council of the Judiciary, made up of former members of the High Council of the Judiciary, who 'can be contacted directly by telephone during the week by any judge facing ethical or deontological difficulties". An extremely important aspect is the fact that the discussions are confidential and anonymous and 'the disciplinary authority may under no circumstances ask these authorities for personal data for the purpose of sanction'. [38, para 138, 139]

It is a different approach from the one regulated at the national level (Republic of Moldova), but thanks to the accessibility, confidentiality and anonymization of the data, it could be a functional mechanism to support judges in difficult ethical or deontological circumstances, which deserves stakeholders' attention.

The same questions

Is the new phenomenon, regarding the filing of referrals by judges against judges, a positive or negative fact?

Should judges, including court presidents, continue this practice or refrain from it?

Does this phenomenon reflect an act of courage and responsibility? Or rather an act of undermining the credibility of justice, by displaying to the public judicial conduct allegedly contrary to judicial discipline?

Preliminary answers

It is positive that judges react to acts allegedly contrary to judicial discipline and notify the competent bodies. In this way, they are no longer isolated in the 'ivory tower' [39, para 1.3] and moderation in expression is not equated with silence (individual, collective or institutional). Also, the analyzed phenomenon reveals the existence of some dissensions within the judicial body, which could shake, to a certain extent, the perception that the judiciary is a closed caste, incapable of self-discipline, through internal mechanisms. From another perspective, the submission of referrals

by judges against judges could be interpreted as a signal that divergent opinions within the judiciary want to be heard and that there is a need for more involvement on the part of judges (individual and/or associated) and judicial self-governing bodies in identifying vulnerabilities and solving them.

On the other hand, conflicts between judges could increase the vulnerability of the judiciary, which in turn could serve as an advantage for political groups and pressure groups in capitalizing on their own interests. The risks could gain scope especially in the development of radical processes of reforming the justice sector, in conditions of reduced credibility of all branches of state power. According to some authors, 'it is clear that, as everything in the law, judicial discipline is sensitive to cultural determinants that cannot be readily modified by legislative innovations' [40, p.64]. The basic variable on which answers regarding reform directions would be based would be the cultural determinants themselves, related to the judiciary, to political actors with decision-making power, to civil society, to the community.

Finally, we have one more question. In the legal system of the Republic of Moldova, judges have the right to join national organizations for the representation of their interests, for professional development and the defense of their status [41, art.4 para (1) letter d)]. In the disciplinary procedure, the concerned judge may be assisted by a lawyer or his/her representative [42, art.25 para (1) letter d)]. 'In some member States [of the CoE], associations of judges represent judges in disciplinary proceedings if they request representation. There can be no objection to judges' associations representing their members in disciplinary proceedings and contributing to ensuring a fair procedure [...]' [43, para 36]. In this new specifics of the phenomenon, regarding the filing of complaints by judges against judges, would the associations of judges accept assisting those judges in disciplinary proceedings?

Another kind of conclusion

As far as we are concerned, we would not like the phenomenon of *judges against judges* to be perpetuated. Nor prosecutors against prosecutors, lawyers against lawyers, etc. We would like to promote *judges for judges*; *judges, prosecutors and lawyers – for justice*.

Remark

In the present study, we refrain from the assessment of the phenomenon of filing disciplinary complaints by judges against judges for reasons based on political or economic interests. In this case, the discussions would transcend the sphere of ethics and judicial discipline and would be transferred to the criminal sphere. In such an approach, the reasonings would also be different.

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