MORAL CONTINGENCY AND OPEN-MINDEDNESS

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This paper aims to solve the tension between moral contingency and open-mindedness by appealing to the role it plays in justifying our moral judgment. Most philosophers attempt to explain the value of open-mindedness by its conduciveness to moral truth, but what is the moral value of open-mindedness „if (as some metaethical theories imply) moral truths are not out there, and that normative judgments are contingent in some way on us?" Tiberius attempted to answer this question by invoking the notion of „resnce". I show that this attempt fails to address the question and I argue that it can be answered by understanding the role open-mindedness plays in justifying our moral judgment to ourselves.

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